“Standpoint theory was never supposed to be a theory about identity.”

An interview with Donna Haraway

Alison Wylie, Emily Tilton, Karoline Paier and Alex Bryant

In this episode, we speak with Donna Haraway, Distinguished Professor Emerita in the History of Consciousness and Feminist Studies at UC Santa Cruz. Donna tells us about how deeply their thinking and activism was informed by close feminist friendships with Sandra Harding and Nancy Hartsock, beginning in the 1980s in the context of Marxist feminist collectives in Baltimore, and also by a lifetime of friendly, if sometimes contentious, debate with Bruno Latour.

We discuss what’s troublesome about the spatial metaphors of “standing and pointing” and why standpoints should be understood as dynamic, crafted and collective work objects. We also talk about what happens when standpoints are no longer adequate to the complexities of the world, and how to navigate situations where friends and allies find they disagree fundamentally, not so much theoretically but in starkly pragmatic terms. There is much wisdom here about learning how to recognize when you are wrong, what we can learn from human and more-than-human others, and how to collectively fight for a better world.

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Alison Wylie: Welcome to *Standpoint Theory: Formation, Contestation, Legacies*. I'm Alison Wylie, here with Alex Bryant, Karoline Paier, and Emily Tilton. We're a working group at the University of British Columbia who share a passion for standpoint theory: its history, the influences that shaped it, the influence that it's had, and how it has evolved in recent decades.

So, today, to introduce this session, we're speaking with Donna Haraway, who's perhaps best known for "Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s" (1985)[1] and *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (1991).[2] Her recent collection of essays, *Beyond the Cyborg: Adventures with Donna Haraway,*[3] which came out in 2013, is concerned that an ongoing fascination with and reproduction of the cyborg has deflected attention –I'm quoting the editors – from a passionate engagement with nature cultures, which they identify as the theoretical core driving your work.

These are themes that I certainly see as central to your recent work on human-nonhuman entanglement in *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*[4] and in *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin with the Chthulucene*.[5] The description of *Staying with the Trouble* online is "living and dying together on a damaged earth."[6]

They're also central to the work *I* first encountered of yours in philosophy contexts. "Primatology is Politics by Other Means"[7] appeared in the 1984 Philosophy of Science Association [PSA] conference proceedings. That was a high point for the PSA conference proceedings for me. Especially relevant to our conversation today is your feminist studies essay, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of

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[1] Haraway, Donna. 1987. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s." *Australian Feminist Studies* 2(4): 1-42.

[2] Haraway, Donna. 1991. *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. London, UK: Free Association.

[3] Haraway, Donna. 2013. *Beyond the Cyborg: Adventures with Donna Haraway*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

[4] Haraway, Donna. 2003. *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness*. Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm.

[5] Haraway, Donna. 2016. *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin with the Chthulucene*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

[6] https://www.dukeupress.edu/staying-with-the-trouble.

[7] Haraway, Donna. 1984. "Primatology is Politics by Other Means." *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* 2(2): 488-524.

Partial Perspective,"[8] which was first presented in a session on Sandra Harding's *The Science Question in Feminism* at the 1987 Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophy Association [APA].

Although you're not primarily known as a 'standpoint theorist,' in these early papers, you articulated a number of key insights that have been central to feminist standpoint theory as it took shape through the '70s and '80s. Especially striking, given the hostile reaction to standpoint theory that dominated discussion a decade later, is how you explicitly reject what you describe as "an easy relativism."[9] As you put it later, in the essay you contributed to *Primate Encounters: Models of Science, Gender, and Society* in 2000, you've always "had trouble sleeping on the soft bed of cultural relativism"[10] – too cushy and feathery.

You say at the beginning of "Situated Knowledges" that "feminists have to insist on a better account of the world," that our problem is "how to have simultaneously an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings, *and* a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world."[11]

Toward the end of that article, you say, "feminist standpoint theorists' goal of an epistemology and politics of engaged, accountable positioning remains eminently potent. The goal is better accounts of the world."[12] In various places you describe this as more adequate, richer, and – crucially – transformative: knowledge that's "potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination."[13] In the course of navigating the poles of disembodied objectivity on one hand and disempowering relativism on the other that had trapped feminist thinking about objectivity, you advocate a doctrine of embodied objectivity.[14] Feminist objectivity, you say, means situated knowledges,

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[8] Haraway, Donna. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies* 14(3): 575-599.

[9] "Situated Knowledges", 585 and Haraway, Donna. 2007. *When Species Meet*. University of Minnesota Press, 296.

[10] Haraway, Donna. 2000. "Morphing in the Order: Flexible Strategies, Feminist Science Studies, and Primate Revisions." In *Primate Encounters: Models of Science, Gender, and Society*, edited by Shirley C. Strum and Linda Marie Fedigan. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 418.

[11] "Situated Knowledges", 579. Emphasis in original.

[12] *Ibid*., 590.

[13] *Ibid*., 585; see also 579, 584.

[14] *Ibid*., 581, 588.

understood in terms of critical positioning.[15] It's a commitment to interrogate, to be accountable for, to take a critical standpoint on knowledge-making processes that are inescapably partial.[16] You say identity "does not produce science, critical positioning does, that is objectivity."[17]

"Situated Knowledges" was a response to Sandra Harding, at a point when she endorsed a kind of 'both-and'-ambivalence,[18] with respect to successor science projects and their postmodern antithesis. Although she was later a staunch advocate of standpoint theory, at that point in *The Science Question in Feminism*,[19] she was ambivalent about its viability as a feminist epistemology. Clearly, you were thinking through these issues in a context of intense intellectual and political engagement with Sandra, with Nancy Hartsock, Evelyn Fox Keller, among others. We wondered, could you tell us more about how your work aligned with theirs or didn't? How it was shaped by, and how you engaged with standpoint theory as it was in formation?

Donna Haraway: I've thought about this since you invited me to do this interview and of many memories of friendship and the effort to do a kind of collective thinking, collective interrogating. Certainly, my friendship with Nancy Hartsock was primary.

Sandra, too, but Nancy and I both taught at Johns Hopkins in those years – from '74 to '80, in my case. Nancy and I played squash together, talking feminist epistemology relentlessly. I was writing for *Women: A Journal of Liberation;* Nancy was part of *Quest: A Feminist Quarterly*[20]. We both identified as Marxist feminists in that period. We were part of a Marxist feminist collective in the city of Baltimore. There was a very strong emphasis on the problem of violence against women and women's presence in the streets. Nancy was an intense and dear friend. In fact, we applied for the job in History of Consciousness *together* to share the job.

I think it was never the same at the level of style. There was always a kind of generative friction in the way we thought about things. Everybody thought we were lovers, and so I got all of this prestige as a lesbian that I never earned. [laughs] But in any case, Nancy's

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[15] *Ibid*., 586, 589.

[16] *Ibid*., 582-583, 586, 588.

[17] *Ibid*., 586.

[18] Wylie, Alison. 1987. "The Philosophy of Ambivalence: Sandra Harding on the Science Question in Feminism." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume* 13: 58-73.

[19] Harding, Sandra G. 1986. *The Science Question in Feminism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

[20] *Quest: A Feminist Quarterly* was a feminist journal published in Washington DC, running from 1974-1982.

formulation of standpoint theory out of [György] Lukács[21] and out of Marxism was really fundamental to me in the late '70s, which was also the period in which I met Sandra Harding. Sandra was incredibly active and generative in setting up meetings at the National Women's Studies Association, which is where I met Karen Barad. In those sessions each of us were giving our little papers – I frankly don't remember what our papers said, though I think they were the germs of our later published papers. What I remember, however, is a kind of intensity of feminist friendship.

It certainly had endured until Nancy died. It has endured between Sandra and me. It's endured between Karen and me – with all of our intersecting similarities and differences. Standpoint theory has an integrity and an identity and a body of literature and so on and so forth. But I think of it more as a *verb* in the way that bell hooks used to talk about 'feminist movement' as the verb of 'feminist moving,' and not as a formulated set of positions.[22]

Feminist standpoint theory for me has begun with, and has kept that quality of, being in motion. When feminist standpoint theory has been faithful to itself, it has been very interrogative. It's been outreaching and dissatisfied. Never, in my view, was feminist standpoint theory a theory of identity. It was always a theorizing, a thinking through, of structured positionality, out of which some kinds of knowledges are more or less likely. *Not certain, but more or less likely*. Where the structural motivations to a kind of denial or self-blindness might possibly be reduced. But only as a collective achievement, and not as finally an identity, but an analysis of the positionality of partial privilege and partial oppression. Nobody is ever in a position either of privilege or oppression, but some kind of play of the two in relation to different aspects of living and dying.

The same person, as well as the same group of people, can be in a position of relative privilege in one domain, and relative oppression in another, and something else in a third. So, it was never an identity theory. I mean, standpoint theory was never about, 'People who were necessarily on the margins, necessarily have such and such a standpoint.' Well, frankly: that's nonsense. That was never what Nancy said, never what Sandra said. I don't think any of the feminists identified with standpoint theory ever regarded it as a theory of identity. It was never something you have. 'Because you are a woman, you have a standpoint.' Standpoint was something crafted. It was a labour of love and work.

It's a little bit like a scientific fact. Something crafted that can be strong or weak, that takes care and feeding. Standpoints don't endure unless they're carefully fed, [laughs] broken down and reassembled. They're collective work objects. The intention is to reduce

[21] Lukács, György. 1971. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. MIT Press.

[22] hooks, bell, 2000. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Pluto Press.

the practices of oppression and domination as much as possible to allow greater flourishing. So, when people started thinking of standpoint theory as a theory of identity, I think it was a fundamental mistake that came, frankly, from horrible reading practices.

Insofar as some people *made* it into a theory of identity – and then quickly one that could be called a form of essentialism, which is another set of moves – it wasn't standpoint theory anymore, though it carried that name, in my view. The critiques were often hostile for a range of reasons that didn't have a whole lot to do with the work in question.

Alison Wylie: I couldn't agree more. With that, in fact, you capture very much our motivation for wanting to work on standpoint theory. Especially at this juncture, now that social epistemologists are embracing standpoint epistemology and don't necessarily know this historic background.

Alex Bryant: One thing that came up in our interview with Sandra Harding was a discussion of her interactions, at conferences and by correspondence, with other philosophers who were working on standpoint at the time.

Donna Haraway: Like Dorothy Smith?

Alex Bryant: This is where I was going to go, actually. So, Dorothy: not necessarily a philosopher and sometimes described as outside of that feminist community that you're speaking of in the SWIP [*Society for Women in Philosophy*] and the philosophy context. I wonder if you had any contact with Dorothy Smith in this period, the early '70s?

Donna Haraway: I think Sandra was the one who pointed me toward reading Dorothy Smith. Then Patricia Hill Collins came into the picture rather quickly. So no, my relation to Dorothy Smith was through reading. I was really never part of the SWIP scene too. There's a way in which all of us are insider-outsider in relation to more than one discipline, including philosophy, even Sandra who more centrally located within that particular organization than most of us.

Sandra, of course, has a PhD in philosophy, but not the kind of philosophy she practiced. She ran *screaming*, [from philosophy of science] tearing her hair out [all laugh]. I think Nancy ran *screaming* from political theory. I must say, while holding on to it, too. The same was true for me, of certain kinds of biology.

I think that all of the people that we're talking about here are inside and outside of more than one academic discipline, as well as more than one kind of activist practice. That really mattered. For example, when people like Kimberlé Crenshaw, and then her allies, proposed intersectionality – just a whole form of thinking practice and activist practice that foregrounds raciality in a way that standpoint theory did not for a long time – it also felt like a kind of natural critique and expansion and elaboration, and foregrounding a kind of way of thinking that was in productive friction, as well as productive elaboration

reciprocally. None of us, that I think of as writers who have been taken up in this way, ever rested easily in our disciplines.

It isn't even that we're interdisciplinary, though we sort of are, as [much as] I think we all became *non*-disciplinary: we took our tools where we could find them, because fundamentally we were part of movement. We were part of movement *toward* something that we could barely imagine – a kind of luring, in bell hooks' terms again.

We were *lured* – this is why speculative fabulation has always been really important to me as philosophical practice – toward what is possible but is not yet. Lured towards something that is not the established disorder in Marxist critical theory terms, and taking your tools where you can find them. Some of us were lucky enough to have jobs, some of us weren't, but I don't think any of us ever had particularly strong loyalties to disciplines.

Alison Wylie: One related question here: somebody else in that period who did crucial work is Evelyn Fox Keller, who was also, like you, trained in a science and then primarily worked as a non-disciplinary science studies person. Did you interact with her much?

Donna Haraway: I think Evelyn and I have always been *for* each other, but never found it easy to relate *with* each other. Therefore, I think we perhaps interacted most easily through teaching each other's work – I mean, we were truly *for* each other, but found it hard to talk to each other. 'm not entirely sure why. I think we were probably competitive to various degrees. The work that Evelyn did, I regard as completely foundational.

I think, it's sort of maybe a joke: Evelyn came from physics, and I came from biology, and I think that accounts for a huge amount of the friction between us. The styles of thinking and writing, a sense of the juiciness of the world.

Karoline Paier: It's really beautiful how you describe these friendships and also collaborations and maybe tensions between other theorists. I wondered if you could say a bit more about what makes the standpoint a collective achievement as you've described it.

Donna Haraway: I think of "Situated Knowledges" as kind of a cousin or maybe a member of the same litter. "Situated Knowledges" is in direct connection to standpoint theory because in some ways, "Situated Knowledges" was my rewriting of Sandra's standpoint theory in feminism – a kind of intervention, kind of friction and collaborative intervention in what was then the standpoint theory in feminism.

So, the answer to your question is that I think that this is an actually existing body of friendship and collaboration. These are people who could not and did not work alone, who were part of feminist movement that grew out of that era, particularly the '70s, and who were shaped in that movement and who took it with us into our friendships.

It was collaborative and collective in the most immediate sense of face-to-face friendship: sometimes difficult, but a kind of eating and drinking and thinking together; giving

papers together, conferences, reading each other's work, assigning it to each other's students, helping our own students do their work with our friends' tools.

It's really face to face. I think of Sandra's current work. Sandra more than me, but both of us in recent years, have had many Latin American feminist colleagues and allies. My friends in Colombia and Brazil and Mexico and Argentina have changed the way I think, and these are face-to-face relationships. I've spoken at their institutions. I've met their students. I've met them at science studies meetings.

I think that feminist movements grow in the flesh. It grows through writing, of course it does. But I think if we aren't *with* each othe.

Alison, you and I being in Teresópolis together[23]. It *matters.* These form affective memories that are intrinsic to our thinking.

Alison Wylie: Yeah, that was pivotal for me.

Donna Haraway: Yeah, me too.

Alison Wylie: With, what? Were there, 20 people there?

Donna Haraway: Yeah.

Alison Wylie: And Shirley Strum.[24]

Donna Haraway: And Thelma Rowell,[25] [with] her sheepskin that kept my feet warm.

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[23] The Wenner Gren foundation brought together 23 participants, including a number of eminent primatologists, including Thelma Rowell (mentioned below), as well as several science studies scholars such as Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, and Evelyn Fox Keller, for an intense week of workshop discussion.

"Changing Images of Primate Societies: The Role of Theory, Method and Gender." 2026. *Wenner-Gren Foundation*. Accessed March 30. https://wennergren.org/symposium-seminar/changing-images-of-primate-societies-the-role-of-theory-method-and-gender/.

[24] Shirley C. Strum (1947-) is a primatologist who has been studying baboons in Kenya since 1972. She is an emerita professor in anthropology at UC San Diego and divides her time between teaching at UC San Diego and living and researching in Kenya. Much of her research challenged gendered assumptions in primate research as well as human exceptionalism in transformative ways. She collaborated with Bruno Latour from 1980s until his death in 2022; their collaboration and her research were integral to the development of Actor Network Theory as well led to the publication of *Primate Encounters: Models of Science, Gender, and Society* (2000).

[25] Thelma Rowell (1935-2024) was a British biologist and zoologist most well known for her research on monkeys and sheep which subsequently challenged core assumptions in the field. Her field research on olive baboons in Uganda contested the so-called "army-model" which privileged the role of male aggression in social hierarchies. Instead, her research showed that researchers need to move away from trying to identify a single unifying "primate pattern" to fully account for the vast range of complex animal behaviors.

Her research on sheep challenged the stereotype that sheep were "mindless" creatures, and more broadly, the view that primates were substantially smarter than other animals; her research on sheep portrays them as social animals that communicate with each other in complex and intelligent ways.

Thelma is one of these people who resisted calling herself a feminist, maybe forever. On the other hand, [she] is *for* women, *for* organisms that nobody else wants to watch. For the kind of slow work practice through which you learn to see that which you cannot see without a kind of work practice, which is not the norm.

Thelma, as well as Jeanne Altmann[26] and other primatologists, developed the work practices to train themselves and their colleagues up to see that which could not be seen with previous field methodologies or lab methodologies.

That frequently meant learning to see 'the young' in a social group of organisms, or the females, or the junior males; or those animals who are not the most visible. [They took an interest, not only in] the loudest, the most obviously, supposedly in charge of things, around whom it turns out social, ecological, biological life does not swirl. That kind of set of practices to learn how the world works, takes what Isabelle Stengers names: slow science.[27] I think of Thelma Rowell and Jeanne Altmann. I think Jeanne came to call herself a feminist. Thelma's more irascible than that.

Alison Wylie: But she struck me as working 'in solidarity' with the creatures she studied, sheep especially, at the time. Whe emphasized how smart sheep are in ways thatpeople don't recognize. I digress.

Donna Haraway: She was very interested in finding ways of working that allowed other animals – whether they're turkeys, sheep – to show how smart they are, what they can do.

Alison Wylie: And she did that for people as well.

Donna Haraway: She did that for people too. Although she was less interested in doing that for people [laughs]. She was kind of amazing. She's one of the people I want to be when I grow up.

Karoline Paier: You'd said that you were active in Marxist collectives. I just wondered if you could tell us what that was like and if you perceived conflicts being in a Marxist collective but also being influenced by the women's movement.

Donna Haraway: Yeah, there were plenty of arguments and so on. I think if we had to choose between the two, we would have chosen feminism, but we felt the two needed each other,

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[26] Jeanne Altmann (1940-) is a Eugene Higgins emerita professor of animal behavior and physiology at Princeton University and one of the first researchers to study primate mothers and their behavior. She's been researching baboons in Kenya since 1981. In *Primate Visions* (1989) Haraway discusses Altmann's research among other women primatologists and describes how they challenged crucial field assumptions with respect to gender, race and human behavior and ended up revolutionizing methodologies and what questions could be asked within the field.

[27] Stengers, I., 2018. *Another Science is Possible: A Manifesto for Slow Science*. John Wiley & Sons.

fundamentally. I also read *Capital* with David Harvey[28] at Johns Hopkins, which was a fantastic experience.

Alison Wylie: Did you read any Lenin in that period?

Donna Haraway: I understood Steve Rose's[29] love of Lenin. I never parked there. For one thing, I think Marx was unique among thinkers of his generation in actually thinking a good bit about the non-human world and the metabolism of the world. Marx had a sense of a metabolism of a world through labor.

I think he was a human-exceptionalist. I think he was a person of his modernist traditions. I think Marx and Pope Francis actually are completely in agreement on, in the last instance, the human being prevails as in the privileged position and that the world is *for* the human. But I also think that the "metabolism of nature"[30] notion in Marx was ripe for development in ways that many of us have taken it, that I don't think Marx would recognize. That sense of being in a shared metabolism as earthlings, I credit Marx with some of that.

Alex Bryant: How has your thinking about standpoint changed over time? You've touched on a few pieces of this, but can you think of specific events or circumstances – political or academic actions – that have contributed to shifts in your thinking about standpoints? Since, say, "Situated Knowledges" came out?

Donna Haraway: I have overwhelmingly used the language of situated knowledges rather than standpoint theory, partly because I think it's less easily turned into an identity theory. Although people manage to do it with that too. People will turn almost anything to identity theory, if you give them half a chance – especially in the United States, where somehow it seems to be important.

I think the answer to your question really is kind of an answer that comes out of phenomenology. It's out of 'breakdown.' It's out of the breakdown of an achieved understanding because it turned out to misdescribe, or not to be able to include, that which turns out to be most important. Things break because they are not adequate to the complexity of the world that needs engagement and that cries out for engagement and

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[28] A link to David Harvey's on-going online series on *Reading Capital:* https://davidharvey.org/reading-capital/

[29] Steve Rose (1938-2025) was a neuroscientist and political advocate for social responsibility in science. Throughout his life Rose has been a critic of biological determinism and reductive sociobiological views as for example expressed in *Not in Our Genes* (1984, co-authored with Richard Lewontin and Leon Kamin). He was married to feminist sociologist of science Hilary Rose (1935-) and they collaborated on several articles, books (such as *Science and Society,* 1969; *Political Economy of Science: Ideology of/in Natural Science,* 1976 and *Can Neuroscience Change our Minds?* 2016*)* as well as political projects and shared a commitment to Marxism and responsible science. Here is a recent (2020) interview with both of them in *Science for the People.*

[30] Marx, Karl. 1992. *Capital: Volume III*. Penguin UK.

description. Standpoints break down. Situated knowledges break down. They often break down because someone threw a rock through the window, right? You have the door open and someone hits you in the head with a brick that goes through the window. This is not my example. Stuart Hall gave this to me.

You think you've got the door wide open. You're standing at the door ready to welcome the world into your capacious theory of liberation and anti-racist work and the rest of it. And, you know, some Black feminist throws a rock through the window and hits you in the head, and you *realize* that your approach has broken down, necessarily and rightly so.

I think that's what changes us. Of course, we have all the best intentions in the world, but that's not what changes [us]. What changes us, I think, is breakdown and a kind of shame too. A kind of... Not guilt exactly, but [a kind of]: 'Oh my God, how really? There *really* was no excuse for not knowing that, but truth is, I didn't know that'.

There was *really* no excuse for not becoming seriously knowledgeable about Mexican culture if I'm living in California. But it took decades before I actually engaged it. When you engage it, it changes you, that kind of thing.

And why do you engage it? You engage it really because something makes you do it, not just out of your good will. You know, the crisis on the border, the extraordinary levels of violence. That effort to somehow deal with the problem of flourishing – not just of human beings on the border, but of the butterflies, the jaguars, and the peccaries. The extraordinary death-dealing militarized zone of the border.

It's simply not optional to engage with that, because the levels of suffering and the need for flourishing are so acute. So that redoes you. It redoes you emotionally and it redoes you intellectually. It redoes your alliances. You're listening to different people. You're talking to different people, often on Zoom. You change. There definitely is a through line, but you realize the utter inadequacy of what you thought you knew.

Alex Bryant: I think what you're saying is connected to some early criticisms that you have of people, say, like Catharine MacKinnon or Marxist feminists, but also of Harding on the sex-gender distinction. What you say in some of those early works is something like: we ought to resist centering a specific account of our objects of knowledge – say, particular accounts of womanhood or the proletarian experience.

Do you think that resistance is connected to your personal expectations that bricks are going to be thrown at some point if we center one experience or another too much? Is that fair to draw that connection?

Donna Haraway: Not exactly. I think it's more the commitment to partial knowledges.

I don't think Sandra Harding was ever anything remotely equivalent to Catherine McKinnon in this regard. The attitude – that may not really be true – came across to me

as a kind of self-certainty that I don't think Sandra ever had in her approaches. Well, a kind of monomania.

My sense of never being able to have just one focus because one focus unwinds. It's like a ball of yarn and the sticky threads as you unwind what you think is a single focus into a very messy world. The messiness of the world has always appealed to me.

And so, I'm interested in figures of cognitive practice. The reason I adopted the notion of cat's cradle, for example – not just as a metaphor, but an actual proposal for an epistemological technology, a thinking practice – [is] that allows the understanding of patterned knowledge through tying strings together and always requiring more than one partner. The patterns can fall apart if a thread is, you know... and then effort to invent new practice, new patterns, but threads can fall out and the whole thing can come undone. I feel like string figuring is a way of talking about the kinds of objects of knowledge that I've tried most to be faithful to, right? And there are various kinds of theoretical approaches that make that hard.

Alison Wylie: One little question related to this. There's a lot of discussion about standpoint as an achievement and how standpoint relates to situated knowledge that underlies the questions that you were foregrounding. In what sense is situated experience the grounding for a standpoint?

Donna Haraway: Situated knowledge is not the same thing as situated experience. Experience can never be simply described. Description practices for experience are themselves complex achievements. You can't just peer into yourself and say, 'There's my experience'. Experience is a complex idea.

I think of Joan Scott and many others [in this connection]. Joan Scott's paper on women's experience[31] is a key one for me – the complexity of the notion of women's experience. I think description is a really important practice. Description practices are difficult. They are collectively invented as well as inherited.

The notion that you can simply describe your own experience is nuts. Anybody who belonged to a feminist consciousness-raising group understands – *should* understand, if you think about it for a minute – what the rules were: what got to count 'as experience' in a consciousness-raising group, and what did not get to count as experience or as some kind of false experience.

What counts as women's experience was *constructed*, and it was often constructed in quite authoritarian ways in consciousness-raising groups. They were hardly touchy-feely.

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[31] Scott, Joan. 1991. "The Evidence of Experience." *Critical Inquiry* 17(4): 773-797.

There was a lot of conflict in consciousness-raising groups. Rightly so. Because what was at stake in women's consciousness-raising groups – and I'm talking about the early '70s now – was this precious object that was proposed as a public thing called 'women's experience'. It frequently in these consciousness-raising groups had to do with the question of violence, sexual violence in particular, [and] forced reproduction. There were privileged items. There were privileged kinds of things that got to count 'as women's experience' more easily than other things.

For example, the pleasure of philosophy didn't really get to count 'as women's experience' readily unless you fought for it. And I know I fought for 'women's experience' to include the pleasure of intellectual life and the privilege of education – and there are some privileges which should belong to nobody and some privileges which should belong to everybody – and what would it take to make something available and truly belonged to?

I fought for philosophical texts in consciousness-raising groups to the horror of my sisters. What got to count as women's experience was fought over; it was never immediately available. It was always an object of construction and critique, *rightly so*. Take back the night marches? Yes, definitely. Philosophical disputation? Yes, definitely. These are both women's experience, and if they aren't, they should be.

Alison Wylie: What I really wanted to get at is a comment you made that learning how to see from below, learning how to understand the world from other people's experience and knowledge frames, is hard work. I think this was in "Situated Knowledges": it "requires at least as much skill with bodies and language, with the mediations of vision, as the highest technoscience visualizations."[32]

So, beyond the implications of recognizing that 'standpoint theory is not an identity theory' and 'experience is as much constructed as anything else we draw on', what would you say about the processes of achieving a critical standpoint on knowledge production – on our own partiality as knowers – is accomplished? What is the learning to see from below? What is the skill required?

Donna Haraway: And the limitations of the metaphor of 'below'. That kind of need [of] many spatial metaphors? I think, insofar as I've made contributions in these areas, it's often finding myself unable to use a metaphor that I just used because it's become *a lie* in some way.

Before I reach the end of a sentence, my tropes break down. I can't get through the sentence without somehow proposing another trope. Narrative practice, tropic practice,

[32] *Situated Knowledge*, 584

not just for the hell of it – though I plainly also enjoy it – but because when you fix on a set of metaphors like 'seeing from below', you're going to be in trouble fast.

In that particular paper, that 'seeing from below' had everything to do with a kind of Star Wars – the platforms, the space platforms from which objective knowledge was produced from above. From the all-seeing vision of the invisible all-seer, the one who is self-invisible *because* disembodied. That notion of objectivity is disembodiment.

I was fighting for objectivity as profoundly embodied, situated, structured, historical. Relentlessly historical. Onion, all the way down, no bottom up; there's no bottom to the onion. That kind of thing. One of the problems of all of the metaphors – of situated knowledges, as well as standpoint theory, as well as every other, I think, progressive theory proposed, including intersectionality – is the danger of ventriloquism. The danger is of kidnapping the point of view of the other, producing another for whom to speak. [laughs] That kind of speaking for, substitution, ventriloquism, kidnapping, self-deluded identity. While actually having no idea how to listen or shut up or be silent. At the same time, it's entirely possible to recognize all of these things and let that depress you, shut you up, take you out of action.

I think partly what I've been trying to cultivate and propose as something *we* cultivate is this kind of ongoing criticality, examination, recognition of limitation, without withdrawing. One of the ways, for example, [some] have responded to the charge of being white, of being racist, of being white, is to shut up. Well, that's okay for a while, but at the end of the day, I think it's rather racist to keep quiet. I think that taking the *risk* of continuing to engage – taking the risk of being wrong, learning how to be wrong without being destroyed, taking the risk of saying, 'No, I don't agree with you, I think you're wrong in this particular instance and I think we need to figure out how to go from here' – all of that is going to result in being hurt, being attacked, being perceived as attacking. And needing to take a deep breath and figure out how to forgive yourself, how to forgive each other, how to *ask* for forgiveness. I suppose I'm using Christian terms, but we need to figure out how to go on without needing to be perfect and without needing the other to be the solution. I don't expect someone else's achievements to be the solution to my difficulties. And yet we are linked.

Karoline Paier: Yeah, this is very fitting, as Emily has just published a paper about this.

Emily Tilton: This is going to lead into a question I was going to ask anyway, but like Karoline was just saying, I did write a paper[33] about how, among white feminists, there's been a tendency to take the insights of standpoint theory and sort of warp them into a justification for being quiet and not contributing. It masquerades as 'listening and

[33] Tilton, E.C., 2024. " That's Above My Paygrade": Woke Excuses for Ignorance. *Philosophers' Imprint*, *24*.

learning,' and trying to be self-critical and reflective of your own positionality. But in fact what it does is excuse opting out.

One question I wanted to ask you is whether you think there's anything about standpoint theory that makes it especially vulnerable to this misappropriation and whether there are things that standpoint theorists ought to be doing to prevent this kind of misappropriation.

You said earlier that if you give anyone – or not anyone, but many people – a chance to turn anything into a theory of identity, they will. So is this a misappropriation of standpoint theory not the fault of standpoint theorists? Or do you think there's something about standpoint theory that lends itself to this kind of thing?

Donna Haraway: Well, kind of all of the above, but I think my basic attitude in this regard is that you're going to get misappropriated no matter what you do. And just relax, take a deep breath. Don't worry so much about it. You don't need to answer every criticism.

In a certain sense, I've never answered any criticism directly. I don't respond that way, but criticism changes me and others. The next thing you do incorporates it in some way. I'm not interested in getting in to arguments, in other words. Not really. For one thing, I hate conflict. It makes me sick to my stomach. I really feel like we need to take a lot of deep breaths and recognize that I misappropriate, you misappropriate, we all misappropriate. Maybe we should just conjugate the verb. and then relax a little bit. [Haraway and Wylie laugh] Okay, so there's that. I think we should take a deep breath and relax and realize it's going to happen.

Maybe you need to put yourself forward, to put yourself and the kinds of things you think are right forward a little better. Get to be a better propagandist, publish a little more, talk a little more – things like that.

Again, I come back to thinking that the word 'standpoint' is an invitation to trouble. Because it's so easily taken as *a place to stand*: 'I'm going to move over there and stand there, and I'm going to see from that point of view'. The critique of modernist perspectivism kicks in *instantly,* because the very choreography of standpoint invites trouble.

It's a visual metaphor. It's from one place visually. It's *just not good enough*. It's good to have that metaphor in the litter of metaphors that are invoked for proposing thinking practices, but I've never been happy with the sort of intrinsic trouble in the notion of the word 'standpoint'. As soon as I hear the word standpoint, I tend to multiply the tropes.

Karoline Paier: I think I agree with you that taking a deep breath and putting yourself forward seems very good.

I wonder if you also have a different strategy for cases where standpoint theory is used for explicitly conservative and right-wing goals. For example, right now we can see that a

lot of TERFs – trans-exclusionary, so-called ‘feminists’ – are using women's experience in a way that's sort of mirrors situated knowledge and does take experience as authoritative when they're saying, ‘We are for women's experiences and we're protecting that’.

Is there something that standpoint theorists, and people concerned with the partiality of knowledge, can do about that?

Donna Haraway: All experiences aren't born equal, and there are plenty of fascist women around, as well as women of good will who have things to say that we don't necessarily want to hear. I'm thinking, for example, [about] reproductive freedom problems and gender-affirming care, reproductive agency, [and] things like that. Where lots and lots of women have positions that I am deeply and profoundly opposed to.

I will argue in public that I think this is a better account of the situation. That if we're going to construct a ‘we’ here, the ‘we’ that I want to construct foregrounds the necessity of autonomy within collectivity.

For example, I just had a probably friendship-destroying a disagreement with a very old friend of mine who's been a pro-life activist for many decades. We finally hit the wall over gender-affirming care, where I thought he would be my ally and it turned out he wasn't. And I think that at some point… you know, the end of a friendship is a very hard thing. But there’s a need to argue against, without turning the other person into an enemy. They may no longer still be a friend: we can't be friends across this gap. It's too much and too deep, and it's gone on too long, and it's over too many things. You and your allies, I believe, are profoundly mistaken. I will work against you in every way I can, but I will do that without turning you into a capital-E ‘Enemy’ insofar as I and we are able. I will oppose you in legislatures. I will oppose you on the Catholic ownership, of hospitals. I will oppose you in the way that the Catholic Church has bought out hospital after hospital, and the bishops have just issued a statement forbidding gender-affirming care in Catholic hospitals, where that's the only place people can get care in many places in this country. And *because* I know Catholic theology very well I am equipped to make these arguments, maybe more than some other folks who don't have a clue about what the bishops are using in their argument.

Again, it's partial knowledges. For example, Pope Francis's *Laudato si’*[34]goes *very* far toward affirming the cry of the Earth, toward affirming a non-human exceptionalist cry of the Earth that requires response – even while in other parts of that encyclical, there is a reaffirmation of human exceptionalism and many other things.

[34] “Laudato Si’ (24 May 2015).” 2026. Accessed March 30. https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html.

My revolutionary Communist Party friend, who has remained an activist for decades in Hawaii, says they always work with the injunction: “find the unity, find the point of agreement, and see if it can be expanded.” Find that place where you can be with each other and see if it can expand. But that doesn't mean you stop opposing where you cannot meet. You expect that from others, and you expect to struggle over power. You expect to struggle over the power of the state and many other things.

Again, there's a sort of emotional cultivation that we encourage in each other that learns to conduct this kind of lifelong work without needing an enemy. There are plenty of male philosophers, Carl Schmitt comes first to mind, for whom the notion of the other is the notion of the enemy in a profound way. I fought with Bruno Latour until the day he died over his use of Schmitt, as opposed to his use of feminists, for developing some of his really important insights – that he was tying both hands behind his back when he was using Schmitt as his philosopher of choice for thinking about questions of otherness. So we fight with each other, but we fight with each other as frenemies and not as capital-O ‘Others’. And that includes the women, and the men too.

I'm taking Spanish these days. This goes back to my beginning to take seriously that I'm an Anglo living in California. Among other things, I’ve been having these really bi-weekly conversations with this Spanish teacher in Querétaro. We were having this interesting argument over a law that was just passed, a federal law in Mexico that applies federal law to Indigenous communities over the question of the age of marriage.

Because Indigenous custom took precedence over Mexican federal law in relationship to the age of marriage, many girls as young as 11 and 12-years-old were made to marry. I object to making girls marry; I know a whole lot about the way the colonial central state imposes its law on Indigenous communities, and the way Indigenous communities continue to oppress women and girls under the cloak of custom and tradition.

This is a really hard issue over sovereignty, and it looks different in Canada, in the United States, and Mexico. These are very different federal and colonial systems. The Indigenous communities in Mexico have a very different relationship to [the colonial state]. For one thing, reservations don't exist so the question of sovereignty doesn't exist in the same way.

Anyway, we had this really interesting struggle. Both of us agreed that forcing girls to marry at the age of 12 is unconscionable, but we had some real friction. She had no problem with extending federal law over Indigenous custom. And I found it a complicated issue. So how do we struggle for women's reproductive and sexual autonomy? In many places the question of situated knowledges arises: being accountable to the positionality of oneself and one's allies, open to other positionalities, and *not* a relativist. This is not a world in which anything goes.

I am *for* some worlds and *not* others. *I am a relationalist, not a relativist*. I will fight for some things, not others, while recognizing the complexity. There's no doubt in my mind that the extension of Mexican federal law to Mexican Indigenous communities over the question of the age of marriage is straight up in the lineage of Mexican-Spanish conquest.

And I still agree with the law, okay? I think they did the right thing. I just think that it's complicated. I am also aware that in Mexican thinking, broadly, those Indigenous communities that have deep patriarchal histories – especially the Aztec for example, [with] the whole mythology of Aztlan – are much better known than Indigenous communities of Mexico – both contemporary and past, both past and present – that are not patriarchal.

Part of the work is figuring out what it takes to give way more space, both in North American imaginations but, frankly, also in Mexican imaginations, to the richness of Mexican Indigenous cultures and histories that aren't patriarchal, that have never given that kind of privilege to the fathers to force their daughters into marriages the daughters don't want. The notion that Indigenous culture is one thing is a big problem, and it's a problem in Mexico as it is elsewhere.

This is another way of saying the ongoing necessity of working *for* some worlds and not others.

Emily Tilton: There's a developing criticism of standpoint theory in contemporary work on standpoint – Liam Bright and Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò come to mind –where the worry is about how standpoint theory might end up being elitist. It centers around the achievement thesis, where the achievement thesis is super important for combating essentialist readings of standpoint theory.

But there's this worry that, in introducing the achievement thesis, you sever the standpoint from the marginalized group, and then you end up in this weird situation where what counts as achieved is the kind of view that's achieved by those who have the time and resources to be doing the kind of thinking that is required for the achievement. I'm curious what you think about this.

Donna Haraway: "Yes. And yes, *but"* is what I think about that. Standpoint theory never regarded the achievement as the *thinker's* achievement, but as the achievement as that kind of working with each other in movement to come to shared understanding of the structure of power, right? People come with different skills and capacities. The person who can write in the academic journal has one set of skills and capacities. That said, the question of unequal privilege is very real. And yes, it's a danger. On the other hand, I think of the 'believe the woman'. Okay. 'Believe the child'. Well, yes and no. The obligation is to be a fallible participant, including the capacity, the obligation, to say sorry.

The ‘believe the woman’ in this case requires a process of investigation and supporting those who bring charges. Yes, Title IX is radically imperfect, but the necessity of supporting those who bring charges – materially and not just intentionally – and also providing some kind of space for investigative process is [crucial]. I don't want to live in a society where that is not our practice.

Emily Tilton: It feels like two things you said earlier are coming together here. One is the importance on insisting on better accounts of the world and how that's connected to evidence gathering and then a willingness to be an active participant and an active inquirer and to not simply defer. Those two things come together in an important way.

Donna Haraway: Realizing that evidence is never just something you pick up off the ground, that it itself is constructed and partial.

Alison Wylie: It also connects with something I didn't mention earlier: from "Situated Knowledges," in connection with understanding how to see from below, you caution against romanticizing, appropriating the vision of those who are subjugated, and you say that standpoints are not innocent positions. They are not exempt from critical re-examination.

I think actually one of the major tasks – and something that Emily's working on – is to ask the question: what is an appropriate jointly moral and epistemic stance, with respect to the testimony of those who are particularly vulnerable?

All too often, you see the bar set way high for somebody who's powerful and respected, and has seeminly the most to lose, and the response is: ‘You can't possibly think *they* did X or Y, right?’

It seems there has to be some calibration of how one responds that is political and moral, as well as epistemic. I think Emily's inclined to disagree with that: ‘put your money on the evidence’. I'm inclined to think we'll never escape a political assessment of the power dynamics, but that assessment is itself empirical.

Emily Tilton: Yeah, no, I definitely think we'll never escape a political assessment of the evidence. I'm interested in where exactly that's going to come into play, and when it comes into play in ways that supplant a thorough critical investigation of the evidence, which I do think you kind in response to this past tendency to overlook the evidence in favor of men who've been accused. That's clearly bad. But I think it's also bad to insert our political commitments into our investigation in ways that supplant evidence, even when our intention is to benefit the woman.

Donna Haraway: I think a kind of being *for* and *with*, a sense, even if you can't quite articulate it, of an imagined world. I think felt moral commitment precedes epistemology and that

thinking practices are rooted in that. Both are subject to change or are engaged in critical historical process, but I don't think knowledge precedes values.

If you had to say one or the other, I think values precede knowledge. I'm unembarrassed in being *for,* in a way that I am more likely to believe folks who I regard as pretty seriously less privileged here, less powerful. I regard that as a political decision, a moral, epistemic decision. I'm going to give the *greatest* benefit of the doubt at the beginning of a process to those who I think come into a situation with the least power.

I'm not going to stop there. It's a starting point. Also, I think that the question of what counts as consequences for people who have the courage to raise a problem, the consequences for those who are in positions of relative power, [is important]. Let's say a faculty member who was accused of something. They might lose their job, their reputation, they lose their friendships. This is not a small set of consequences, but they're kind of easy to describe.

The consequences for a student are a whole lot harder to describe because the student is at a different point in their life. The student may find themselves having lost confidence in academia. The consequence for a student might be a lack of trust, that then in turn undermines their access to things that they would have otherwise loved to have, including an education. The consequences for a student can be huge, but relatively harder to know. They might not sound as polished, as rational – they aren't as polished, they don't have the same tools yet. And it's easy not to hear them. If you end up having an education as opposed to being an Irish Catholic mother of 10, you'd better use it. You better use it for folks, for people that you think deserve help. You better put your tools to work.

Alison Wylie: One further thought on that. The values, the affective attachments that would inform your judgment about where to start and how to start are also formed by evidential engagement with the world.

Emily Tilton: One of the things that you said was if there was an allegation, you would be inclined to believe the person with less power, less institutional resources first. You describe it as a political stance, which is a description that I get. But I'm inclined to describe it as something that's rooted *in* evidence I have and that forms the basis *of* my political commitments.

Donna Haraway: It's rooted in history too. It's rooted in having studied.

Emily Tilton: Yeah, it's like a person with less institutional power is taking a much bigger risk. That's evidence that's available to us. The frequency of false reports is evidence that's available to us. So I'm more inclined to explain this more in evidence terms.

Donna Haraway: I don't think using one language excludes the other.

Alison Wylie: Some of this comes out of debate within philosophy as social epistemologists more and more engage issues of how moral-political commitments and pragmatic considerations of languages impinge, or "encroach" upon, epistemic judgment. These issues come up in stark terms in the standpoint literature – if it could be a verb, in standpoint thinking – as a felt need to circumvent or sidestep or unravel the oppositional setup. The trap seems very similar to what you identified as a conundrum that afflicted feminist discussion in the mid-80s. I'm astonished, all these decades on, to see it resurface and to see how similar the framing is.

Donna Haraway: We don't read anything that wasn't published within the last five years. Used bookstores won't accept books that are older than about five years. And we keep erasing our forebearers. Women in particular drop off the cliff *really fast*; they drop out of citation apparatuses way faster than men do.

Alison Wylie: You internalize the cognitive schemas that track accurately who is going to be seen as authoritative, and that reinforces whether you will be a part of that erasure or not.

Speaking of which, just one other thought I had as I was reading around for this conversation. It's striking that what you were saying in 1983 and 1987 anticipate what Bruno [Latour]'s "Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?" (2003),[35] and then Collins and Evans', "The Third Wave [of Science Studies]" (2007).[36] They're all pulling back from disabling, undermining, disempowering relativism and saying: 'We wanted to level the playing field, but that's not what we had in mind.' *You* said that to Latour in 1983 and 1987. What was his response?

Donna Haraway: I said, 'Look, you aren't citing the feminist literature and you guys think you invented it and you didn't.'

Alison Wylie: I remember a PSA session on *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993),[37] where you took Latour to task very gently, very systematically. You identified a whole range of people he could have been citing for exactly the same kinds of points he was making. He said: 'Oh, Donna, Donna, it my publisher made me do it. It was supposed to be a popular book.' Well, if it his editor was saying, 'Make it accessible to a wide readership', that's even more reason to broaden the frame of who you bring in.

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[35] Latour, Bruno. 2004. "Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern." *Critical Inquiry* 30(2): 225-248.

[36] Collins, H.M. and Robert Evans. 2002. "The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience." *Social Studies of Science* 32(2): 235-296.

[37] Latour, Bruno. 1993. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Harvard University Press.

Donna Haraway: It must be said, Bruno changed. And he changed *because* feminists, who were also his dear friends, kept fighting with him. Because it mattered, because he was a friend, and because he was important. Because he had really neat ideas. Because I learned a lot *from* Bruno and I think he learned a lot *from* me and he needed to cite it. And finally, I think Bruno got it.

We kept at it.

But look at the obituaries of Bruno, for which I cannot hold him responsible. A lot of those obituaries go back, more or less explicitly, to the idea that whatever it was I did came *after* his work.

Alison Wylie: Oh, my. I haven't looked at many of them. I didn't know that.

Donna Haraway: I'm not angry enough to write do anything about it.

Alison Wylie: Yeah, but, so disappointing.

Donna Haraway: Women are disappeared, or subordinated, in a hurry. Sticking up for ourselves is important, and [for] each other.

Karoline Paier: Our last question to the end is: what's the legacy of standpoint theory and situated knowledges, looking ahead?

Two questions that would be interesting to talk about are: what difference standpoint theory made to your own work in the end, and whether there are any particular issues or questions – work undone, promising projects – that you'd like to see from future philosophers and people?

Donna Haraway: Don’t do that to a 78-year-old mortal woman [everyone laughs]. Sandra is way more interested in continuing to work and being productive than I am. Frankly – seriously – I don't want to take on new projects at this point in my life. I actually want to open up for something that's not work.

That doesn't mean you can drop your alliances. I think it's really important to let life have different rhythms. Frankly, at this point in my life, I am resolute about not taking up new projects, enjoying other people's projects and letting myself be an elder. I kind of like being an elder, and I kind of like acknowledging what the French and Spanish might call *jubilation*, jubilation, retirement. I'm fine with being an old woman and not taking up and not having to have a new project, because I think one of the ways that we oppress each other in our society is needing *always* to be productive.

Well, frankly, we don't always need to be productive. One of the ways I think we disempower ourselves politically in the university is by being too busy. Everybody is always too busy and always feeling guilty about the undone and needing a new project – needing to justify it, needing to get money and on and on and on. We impose it on our

students too, and I think it's a violation. So as an old lady, I'm kind of interested in saying that.

Alison Wylie: That's wonderful. Are you doing agility trials and dog training?

Donna Haraway: I have a dog now who's not interested in agility.

Alison Wylie: Oh my goodness [laughs].

Donna Haraway: It's been a difficult adjustment on my part. Shindychew, she loves lure coursing and she's faster than the fast whippets. But the trouble is Santa Cruz doesn't have any consistent lure courses, and lure coursing is hard to find. Shindychew and I have studied agility together and done agility lessons and competed a little bit. Truth of the matter is, she doesn't have any drive in agility. It's not her thing, and I decided that I was not going to spend the next five years figuring out how to make her get really excited about something that she wasn't really excited about.

So, no, I'm not doing agility and I'm finding this an adjustment. With Cayenne,[38] who loved to do it, we were just kind of natural partners. You know, she lived to be almost 17 and about 12 of those years, about 12 of those years, we were doing agility together – not at her very last years. I can't tell you how much Cayenne taught me and how much we did together, but Shindychew and I are learning different things with each other.

Alison Wylie: She sounds like the perfect dog.

Donna Haraway: I think this is a good example of somebody teaching you something you didn't know you needed to learn.

Karoline Paier: You've been listening to Standpoint Theory, Formation, Contestation, Legacies. This podcast was recorded on the traditional ancestral unceded territory of the Musqueam people. It was produced in the community-engaged documentation and research space by Alison Wylie, Emily Tilton, Karoline Paier, and Alex Bryant. Special thanks to Lilith Charlet for editing and technical support, Matthew Smithdeal, and Rachel Cripps for illustration. Thanks also to the University of British Columbia Philosophy Department. This research was undertaken in part thanks to funding from the Canada Research Chairs Program.

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[38] For an interview with Donna Haraway where they talk more about their relationship with her dog companion Cayenne, see here: https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/making-kin-an-interview-with-donna-haraway/

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